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SEARCHING FOR NEW "PARTICLES" IN THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ATTRIBUTION
OF "CLIENTHOOD"
Theodore J. Schneyer

An awful lot of law is being made these days under the heading,
"who is the lawyer's client." I am not sure if this is a good or bad thing.
I am just here to report on the phenomenon and think a little bit about
what it says about the present state of the law of lawyering.
I.

PARTIAL CLIENTS

Atomic physics used to be easy. Atoms contained electrons and
protons and neutrons, and it was not hard for the physicist to tell which
particles were which. The law of lawyering used to be easy, too. It
distinguished sharply between lawyers' duties to clients and to nonclients, and it relied on relatively straightforward tests to identify the
clients. True, lawyers owed somewhat different duties to different sorts
of clients. For example, prosecutors could choose for themselves the
ends to be sought in representing the people, while private lawyers were
expected to defer to their clients' wishes. And a few sorts of nonclients,
such as beneficiaries under a negligently drafted will, were given a right
to sue lawyers for malpractice, which other non-clients lacked. Still,
even without a score card, it was easy enough for lawyers and judges to
tell the clients from the nonclients, and having done so, to know just
what duties a lawyer owed to the parties at hand. That was then.
Nowadays, just as physics has discovered neutrinos and gluons, so
the law is recognizing various types of partial clients, that is, parties who
enjoy some of the traditional rights of clienthood, but not others. These
new legal particles include prospective clients, derivative or quasi-clients, nonclients who nonetheless stand in special confidential relationships with a lawyer, and secondary as opposed to primary clients. These
new particles are turning what once seemed like a sharp dichotomy
between clients and nonclients into something that looks much more like
a continuum, a gradual scale.
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Let me take a minute to define these concepts. A prospective client
is somebody who consults a lawyer about a matter so that the two can
decide whether to create a lawyer-client relationship. To promote these
useful consultations, the law, rather than any contract, protects the prospective clients' confidences.
A derivative client is someone with whom a lawyer has no contract,
but to whom the lawyer still owes distinctive duties because the lawyer's
true client owes that party such duties as a fiduciary. The best-known
example, and Geoffrey Hazard has written beautifully about it, is the
ward whose guardian hires a lawyer for advice in carrying out his fiduciary duties. The lawyer's duty to the ward is derived from the guardian's
duty. If the lawyer realizes or should realize that the guardian has been
stealing from the ward, then in at least some states the lawyer must take
steps to protect the ward, even at the cost of disclosing the guardian's
confidences. Now, here is the interesting part. As I read the cases, this
could be true even in states where the lawyer's duty of confidentiality
would bar the lawyer's disclosure for the protection of any third party
who was not a derivative client. In this sense, the lawyer's duty to the
ward turns on the ward's status as a partial client, not on any general
exception to the duties of confidentiality that lawyers owe to their clients
as against nonclients. Notice also that because the lawyer has this derivative duty to the ward, the lawyer's duties of confidentiality and loyalty
to the guardian are somewhat reduced, even though the guardian did not
knowingly agree to waive any of his rights of full clienthood. By operation of law, one might say, the guardian himself is demoted to the rank of
partial client.
The best-known example of a nonclient who stands in a special confidential relationship with a lawyer comes from the 7th Circuit's decision
in the Westinghouse case. In that case, in preparing a report to Congress,
lawyers at Kirkland & Ellis, Washington gained sensitive business information from the member companies of their entity client, a trade association. The association had asked the member companies to give the
lawyers this information and had assured the members that the information would be kept confidential. The information, it turned out, could
have been helpful to Kirkland & Ellis lawyers in the Chicago office who
were pursuing an antitrust claim on behalf of their client, Westinghouse,
against several energy companies that belonged to the trade association.
Those members had no contract for legal services with Kirkland & Ellis
and were therefore not clients for most purposes. For example, only the
association, not the members of the association, had any right to instruct
the law firm in preparing the report to Congress. Nonetheless, these
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members were clients enough to disqualify Kirkland & Ellis from continuing to represent Westinghouse on the ground that their confidences
were entitled to protection.
A secondary client is a client by contract, a real client, whose rights
against the lawyer are cut back by operation of law in order to accommodate the lawyer's duties to another, primary client. If all conflicts of
interest between clients could be avoided ex ante, before they happened,
then there would not be any need to develop any primary, secondary,
distinction. But, as a recent California case, Flatt v. Superior Court,
shows, they cannot all be avoided and the problem becomes one of
encouraging the lawyer to make the best of a bad situation. In that case,
the plaintiff had retained the defendant lawyer to represent him in bringing a claim against an unidentified third party. The plaintiff was not
merely a prospective client. But the lawyer soon learned that the party to
be sued was, in unrelated matters, his own client of longer standing. So,
the lawyer told the plaintiff that he could not bring the suit, and he withdrew. After the statute of limitations ran on the plaintiff's underlying
claim, the plaintiff sued the lawyer for negligently failing, at the time of
withdrawal, to advise him to seek other counsel so that his claim would
not become time barred. Even though a lawyer who withdraws, before
filing a client's claim would normally be expected to warn the client
about the statute of limitations, the court said, this is not the case when
the warning would prejudice another client of longer standing. Preserving the latter's full client rights necessitates limiting the rights of the
newer and therefore secondary client.
Is the concept of a "secondary client" really necessary in today's
law of lawyering? Well, you could argue that any lawyer who foolishly
takes on a new client without determining that the adverse party in the
new matter is also a client ought to be damned if he does warn the new
client about the statute, and damned if he does not. Why give the lawyer
a liability escape hatch if he chooses to favor one client over the other?
The court apparently felt that warning the departing client would be the
greater of two evils, and wanted to structure the lawyers' incentives in
order to discourage that evil. The only way to do this was to acknowledge the existence of a hierarchy among clients.
A much more important application of the secondary client concept
involves insurance defense work. A debate has been raging during the
ALI Restatement Project about how to model the three-party relationship
that arises when a lawyer is retained by an insurer to defend a liability
claim against an insured. Recognizing the potential conflicts that can
arise between insurer and insured, the ALI first tried to model the situa-
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tion as one in which the insured is the sole client and the insurer is
merely a third party payor. Traditionally, a third-party payor is not supposed to interfere with the lawyer's independent judgment in representing the client. But, claiming that this characterization would have dire
consequences for the insurer's rights to sue the lawyer for malpractice if
something goes wrong, to control the defense, and to use in-house lawyers as liability counsel, insurance companies have balked at the ALI's
initial modeling of the situation. The latest drafts of the Restatement, as
I understand it, relent a bit. They recognizes that the one-client model is
only a default rule, that the insurance company can contract to be a coclient if it wishes. But when this happens, the Restatement will apparently not treat the co-clients as equals. In other co-client situations, a
principle of client equality has been understood to bar a lawyer from
continuing the representation, if one client tells the lawyer something in
secret that would be relevant to the other's decisions in the matter, unless
the lawyer is permitted to disclose the information to the other client.
Under that analysis, a defense lawyer who learned something from the
insured that threw policy coverage into doubt but bore on liability as
well, would be expected to share that information with the insurer, the
co-client, or to resign. The Restatement appears instead to treat the
insurer as a secondary client in this respect, one who is not entitled to the
information. The premise here seems to be that the lawyer's financial
incentives are always skewed in favor of the insurer and that as a kind of
correction the law should give the insured certain protections that are
normally unavailable to a co-client.
II.

ATrRIBUTIONS OF CLIENTHOOD

Putting aside these new statuses that are somewhere between client
and nonclient, we find that the client-nonclient distinction is getting more
complicated in other ways as well. There is a growing uncertainly over
the tests for distinguishing clients from nonclients, and controversy about
the proper application of those tests. Moreover, when the client is an
artificial entity, such as a class or a corporation, there is often controversy over which of the entity's constituents should count as the client
for such purposes as the anti-contact rule or the attorney-client privilege.
Accordingly, the courts are increasingly called upon to make two types
of "attributions of clienthood." "Type One" attributions determine
whether some party X is or is not, was or was not, the legal client of
lawyer Y. "Type Two" attributions determine which constituents of an
entity client count as that client for some legal purpose. In both fields,
legal decisionmakers display a growing interest in using their attributions
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to achieve policy goals, and in particular to structure lawyers' incentives
properly.
I don't have time to focus on Type Two attributions today, but they
do raise fascinating policy problems. Just to give you a feel for the subject, I will mention one such problem. Class actions pose the risk that
lawyers will manage the case for their own benefit, entering into settlements that are not in a class's interest and collecting fees that are higher
than necessary to ensure adequate representation. This risk of undue
agency costs is very acute because the class representative is usually a
figure head chosen by the lawyer and usually has too small a stake in the
case (and too little sophistication) to monitor the lawyer effectively on
behalf of the class. As a response to this risk of undue agency costs,
rules of civil procedure require trial judges to determine that a class representative is adequate, to review any settlement the class counsel proposes, and to approve class counsel's fees. Many critics contend,
though, that these devices insufficiently protect class members. Judges
have a strong interest in clearing class actions from their dockets, and
once the parties negotiate a settlement, nobody has any incentive to point
out the shortcomings of that settlement or of the proposed attorney's
fees.
Focusing on investors' class actions for securities fraud, Elliott
Weiss, and John Beckerman recently proposed some innovative reforms
to deal with these agency cost problems. These class actions usually
begin when a lawyer becomes aware of a substantial drop in the price of
a company's stock after the company announces worse than expected
earnings or some other bad news. The attorney briefly investigates,
prepares a complaint on behalf of the relevant class of investors, alleging
that the company's previous disclosures were fraudulent, and recruits a
small stakes investor to represent the plaintiff class. If several complaints are filed, then the cases are usually consolidated. The court typically appoints as lead counsel the lawyer who filed first, and also
appoints that lawyer's chosen class representative.
Weiss and Beckerman marshall considerable evidence that these
cases produce less than optimal settlements for the class, that class representatives are ill-informed about the merits of the settlements, that judges
routinely approve these settlements, and that judges do not or cannot
adequately review proposals for attorney's fees. They also show that in
virtually all cases the class includes one or more large institutional investors, like a pension plan or a mutual fund. These institutions, unlike the
investors who usually serve as class representatives, would have the
sophistication to monitor lawyers effectively and a large enough stake in
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the outcome to justify their doing so. Their active participation would
thus help to align the behavior of class counsel as agent with the interest
of the class as principal. Accordingly, Weiss and Beckerman would
encourage institutional investors to serve as class representatives and
they would encourage the courts to appoint them. They would require
courts to appoint as lead counsel the lawyer for the most adequate lead
plaintiff. And it would be the most adequate lead plaintiff who, as the
class representative, and would be riding herd on the lawyers. The
Weiss-Beckerman proposals were in large part incorporated in the Federal Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
In the area of Type One attributions, the courts are treating the question of who is a client less and less as one of contract, and more and
more as a question to be answered on policy grounds. This is happening
for several reasons. First of all, there are all kinds of models of
clienthood around. In the insurer-insured situation, for example, it is
possible to model the insured and the company as co-clients or as one
client with a third-party payor. The lawyer hired to assist in the administration of an estate could be viewed as representing the fiduciary, the
estate itself, or even the beneficiaries. Likewise, close corporations and
partnerships can plausibly be viewed as entity clients or as aggregations
of individual clients.
One vehicle the courts are using to make Type I attributions on policy grounds is the "reasonable expectations" test. If a lawyer does something that makes somebody reasonably expect that he is a client, then he
is, regardless of what the lawyer's intentions might have been. But reasonable expectations are in the eyes of the beholder, and that means that
judges have tremendous latitude to see reasonable expectations when
they think it would be a good idea to see them, and not to see them when
they think it would be a bad idea. And that is a wedge in for policy.
Can there ever be a general body of law to govern all Type One
attributions of clienthood? I doubt it. When questions of clienthood
arise, courts often think about them in the context of the substantive law
area that is involved. They "contextualize" the law of clienthood. If you
compare the insurance situation with labor union cases, I think you can
see that. In the insurance cases, the tendency is to want to think of the
insured as the client, or at least as a co-client, because you are worried
that the lawyer's loyalties to the insurance company may be unduly
strong. The lawyer is hired by the insurance company, the lawyer wants
their business in the future, etc., etc.
In the labor context, lawyers are hired by unions to pursue grievances in arbitration. Those grievances may relate to the plight of a par-
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ticular worker who was fired or disciplined. The cases have generally
held that if the lawyer does a bad job and as a result the worker is not
reinstated or given back pay, that lawyer is not to be treated as a lawyer
for the worker. That lawyer is instead to be treated as a lawyer for the
union alone, with the implication that the union member has no right to
sue that lawyer for malpractice. This issue has to do with whether grievances really belong to labor unions and are to be viewed from the union's
collective standpoint, or whether they belong to the individual grievants.
Generally, the federal courts have come down on the side of saying that
grievances really belong to the union. And that, I believe, is what
explains why courts refuse to regard the union member whose grievance
triggers all this as a client, even though the situation is factually very
much like the insurance situation. The lawyer is hired by the union, and
wants to be hired by the union again. All the tugs of loyalty naturally run
in that direction. Why not protect the individual grievant by allowing
him to be a client and to sue the lawyer for malpractice? I think the
answer lies in labor law, not in any general principles of professional
responsibility.
These are my musings about some of the things that are going on
right now in the law of clienthood. I might say that John Leubsdorf
recently published an article in which he expressed a concern about the
development of the new policy-oriented or functional approach to
clienthood. I am not as concerned as he is that this leaves lawyers in a
lurch because lawyers will never be able to know in advance who, after
the dust clears, a court will say they owe their various duties to. By
designing rules on these subjects, the courts can put lawyers on notice of
the direction in which their various duties run. We do not necessarily
leave lawyers at sea by making policy-based inquiries into who counts as
a client.
One other thing. I believe that the growing importance of issues of
clienthood in the law of lawyering implies a shift in political authority to
make that law. The ABA ethics codes, state that they are not designed to
answer the legal question of who is a client. And indeed questions of
clienthood mostly get resolved not in disciplinary cases, where ethics
rules are central, but in disqualification cases, malpractice cases, and
cases involving the application of the attomey-client privilege. That
means that the big new players in making the law of lawyering are likely
to be common-law judges rather than the ABA and the state supreme
courts that adopt ABA rules. And if that is the case, of course, it means
that the power will have shifted from the ABA to the American Law
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Institute, which in preparing its new Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, will be influencing those judges more than the ABA ever has.

